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Abstract
A major challenge for Agreement Technologies is the combination of existing technologies and rea-
soning methods. In this paper we focus on the three core layers of the Agreement Technologies tower,
called Norms, Organization and Argumentation. We present a framework for arguing about agreements
based on norms, roles and dependence, together with a case study from the sharing economy.
1 Introduction
Agreement technologies refer to computer systems in which autonomous software agents negotiate with one
another, typically on behalf of humans, to come to mutually acceptable agreements.1 The concept “agree-
ment” bridges individual and collective reasoning, i.e. the micro and macro level studied in economics and
the social sciences. The agreement technologies handbook [10] distinguishes five technologies: for semantic
alignment and interoperability, for normative and legal reasoning, for organizations, for argumentation and
negotiation, and for trust and reputation management. They are developed in distinct research communities,
and this plurality of methods is seen as a strength rather than a weakness. Consequently, a major challenge
is how to combine existing technologies and reasoning methods. This leads to our research problem:
Question. How to combine norms, roles, dependence and argumentation for Agreement Technologies?
Boella and van der Torre [3] sketch an architecture combining reasoning methods for all five layers using
abstraction, Billhardt et al. [2] propose to represent agreements using dependence, and in earlier work [5]
we propose an abstract model for arguing about agreements using dependence networks. Building on these
ideas, we introduce an abstract model for arguing about agreements with organizational roles and norms.
In our new model, we represent a possible agreement as a role based social dependence network, that is,
a labeled graph on role playing agents. The agents in a dependence are called the depender and performer
respectively, and the labels are reasons (goals, tasks, resources and norms), together with cost and benefit
functions for the performer and the depender respectively. The goals, tasks and resources are associated with
the agents, whereas the norms are associated with the roles the agents play. We consider also agreements
about which norms are in force, and agreements on which roles the agents play.
We do not study normative reasoning itself, or dependence networks, role assignment, or argumentation—
each of which has a huge literature [10]—but we consider only their interaction. Moreover, we consider nei-
ther the lowest layer of semantic alignment and interoperability, nor the upper layer of trust and reputation.
The layout of this paper is as follows: Section 2 introduces the problem of combining reasoning and how
it has been addressed in the literature. Section 3 and section 4 describe the kind of agreements we can reason
on, and how roles and norms influence such agreements using a real world scenario of sharing economy.
∗The present research is supported by the National Research Fund, Luxembourg, CoPAInS project (code: CO11/IS/1239572).
1See the website of the European Network http://www.agreement-technologies.eu/ for a historical development of
agreement technologies.
2 Methodology
2.1 Combining reasoning
We use logic and reasoning as our methodology, and we are inspired by two authors. First, Dov Gabbay [9]
combines logics using labeled deductive systems and fibring semantics, and more recently his network
perspective combines or integrates logical methods with, for example, neural network reasoning and Baysian
network reasoning. He promotes formal approaches to practical (individual) reasoning, and more recently
he studies normative reasoning and argumentation as ways to combining individual and collective reasoning.
Second, Johan van Benthem [13] uses recursive axiomatizations in modal logic as a general approach to
combine logics of individual agents, distinguishing dynamic epistemic logics, preference logics, logics of
questions, game logics, and more. An application of this theory is in understanding natural language, where
combining modalities and conditionals is a central challenge.
We use individual and collective reasoning methods developed in artificial intelligence and multiagent
systems. For example, knowledge based systems typically combine various reasoning methods. As another
example, IBM’s Watson2 integrates specialized reasoners for space and time in its system. Our work in AI
is in line with the work in philosophy and logic of Gabbay and van Benthem, and that there can be fruitful
exchange of ideas and methodologies between philosophy, logic and artificial intelligence.
2.2 Dependence networks
Castelfranchi and colleagues [7, 12, 4] develop a theory of dependence networks, applicable to most social
interactions. The abstract dependence networks we use in this paper are directed graphs labeled with various
kinds of reasons [15]: the fulfillments of goals and ought-to-be obligations, the execution of tasks and ought-
to-do obligations, and the production of resources. Our model of arguing about dependence [5] follows
Sauro [11] in that every reason can occur only in the dependence relations of a single depender. In contrast
to Sauro, we represent only OR-dependence, no AND-dependence, such that we do not consider jointly
performed tasks, agents together fulfilling a goal, or together providing a resource. In other words, we
assume that tasks, goals and resources can be performed, fulfilled or provided by a single agent as in [6].
For the individual agents, our model of arguing about dependence [5] uses a standard cost-benefit analy-
sis. Each dependence comes with a cost for the performer, and a benefit for the depender, which are positive
real numbers. The payoff for an agent is the sum of the benefits of each reason where he depends, minus
the sum of the costs of the reasons where he performs. An investigation into uncertainty, utility, and the
dependence among reasons, are left for future research.
2.3 Case study: the sharing economy
Agreement technologies are developed around a number of case studies, and we believe that such case
studies are indispensable. An example of an extensive case study in combining reasoning is work of Gabbay
and colleagues on formalizing the Talmud [1]. We are developing a case study on the sharing economy.
Example 1 (Sharing economy) In the collaborative or sharing economy, owners of underused resources
connect with others willing to pay to use them. The connection between owners and users may be made
directly or peer-to-peer, or indirectly via a service. For example, car sharing has environmental benefits,
reduces the cost of fuel and tolls, and allows commuters who are more than two per car to use the carpooling
lanes on highways during peak traffic hours and thereby, to save time.
Our running example is a peer-to-peer car sharing with on the one hand, two car owners, Betty and
Cathy, each driving their own car and looking to give a ride to a single passenger, for example to share
the costs and save money. On the other hand, two other people, Arthur and Dana, both need to get a ride,
Arthur to visit his mother, and Dana to go to work. Furthermore, Arthur prefers to get a ride with Betty over
sharing the car of Cathy. Betty does not want to drive with him, but she is obliged to do so.
2http://www-03.ibm.com/innovation/us/watson/
3 Role based agreements
3.1 Role playing agent dependence networks
An abstract dependence network is a labeled graph, represented by a binary relation D among abstract nodes
represented by N , and labeled by E. If (d, p, e) ∈ D for d, p ∈ N and e ∈ E, then we say that d depends
on p for reason e. Following the usual terminology in this area, we also say that p has power over d due
to reason e. We call node d the depender, and node p the performer of the dependence. Each dependence
comes with a real valued benefit for the depender, and a real valued cost for the performer.
Definition 1 (Abstract dependence network) A dependence network DN is a tuple 〈N,E,D, c, b〉 where
N and E are two disjoint sets, and D ⊆ N × N × E is a binary (dependence) relation over N for each
element of E, and c, b : N × E → IR0 are (cost, benefit) functions associating non-negative real numbers
with each pair of elements of N and E.
We distinguish three kinds of abstract dependence networks, namely agent dependence networks, role
dependence networks, and role playing agent dependence networks. N is instantiated with agents, roles
or role playing agents respectively, and E is instantiated with goals, tasks, resources (reasons for agent
dependence), or norms (reasons for role dependence). The role playing agent dependence network is defined
in terms of the other two, together with a relation plays, which are pairs of an agent and a role, representing
the role playing agents. We make several simplifying assumptions to facilitate the formal framework. Labels
are specific to dependers, in the sense that distinct dependers cannot depend for the same reason. Agent
reasons and role reasons are distinct sets, and every role is played by at most one agent. We represent only
OR-dependence, no AND-dependence, i.e., we do not consider jointly performed tasks, agents together
fulfilling a goal, or together providing a resource. In other words, we assume that tasks, goals and resources
can be performed, fulfilled and provided by a single agent. These constraints are not realistic for some
applications, and we are aware that they have to be relaxed in future work.
Definition 2 (Role playing agent dependence network) Agent dependence networksADN = 〈A,E1, D1,
c1, b1〉 and role dependence networks RDN = 〈R,E2, D2, c2, b2〉 are abstract dependent networks such
that (d1, p1, e), (d2, p2, e) ∈ D1 or D2 implies d1 = d2. An agent role assignment plays ⊆ A × R is
a set of pairs of agents and roles, such that (a1, r), (a2, r) ∈ plays implies a1 = a2. If A ∩ R = ∅
and E1 ∩ E2 = ∅, then the role playing agent dependence network for ADN , RDN and plays is an ab-
stract dependence network 〈plays,E,D, c, b〉 such that E((a, r)) = E1(a)∪E2(r), D((a1, r1), (a2, r2), e)
if and only if D1(a1, a2, e) or D2(r1, r2, e), c((a, r), e) = c1(a, e) if e ∈ E1, c2(r, e) if e ∈ E2, and
b((a, r), x) = b1(a, e) if e ∈ E1, b2(r, x) if e ∈ E2.
Example 2 illustrates how three possible agreements for sharing a car are built up.
Example 2 (continued) Consider the dependence network visualized in Figure 1.1. By convention, a de-
pendence of d on p for the reason e is visualized by an arrow from d to p labeled with e. For example, if
the reasons represent resources, then the flow of resources is inverse to the direction of the arrows. To read
these figures, it is easier to start from Figure 1.4 on the right hand side, and see how it is built up using the
other three figures. In Figure 1.4, three large ovals are visualized one above the other, to represent the three
proposals for agreements: Arthur shares Betty’s car, Arthur shares Cathy’s car, or Dana shares Cathy’s
car. Figure 1.4 is explained in more detail in Example 3 and 4. A dependence in Figure 1.4 can originate
from the agents in Figure 1.1, or from the roles they play in Figure 1.2, and the reasons, costs and benefits
visualized in the figures explain in more detail why a role playing agent depends on another role playing
agent. The set of role playing agents is given by the agent role assignment in Figure 1.3, but a : r1 and c : r3
are visualized twice in Figure 1.4 to make the proposals for agreements more explicit. Every dependence
in Figure 1.4 is derived from either the agent dependence network in Figure 1.1, or the role dependence
network in Figure 1.2. In Figure 1.1, the four nodes represent the agents a for Arthur, b for Betty, c for Cathy
and d for Dana. Dependence (a, b, e1) may be read as “agent a, Arthur, depends on agent b, Betty, to visit
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Figure 1: Building agreements: Agent dependence (1), Role dependence (2), Role assignment (3) and the
combination (4).
his mother,” (a, c, e1) as “agent a, Arthur, depends on agent c, Cathy, to visit his mother,” and (c, a, e2) as
“agent c, Cathy, depends on agent a, Arthur, to save money.” The reason e1 can be a goal of the agent a to
visit his mother, or a task of Betty or Cathy to give a ride for the visit, or the car shared for the visit can be
a resource. The benefit for a to visit his mother by riding with b (3), is greater than by riding c (2), whereas
the cost for b and c is 1. We write costs with a “−” sign and benefits with a “+”. Furthermore, dependence
(d, c, e3) may be read as “agent d, Dana, depends on agent c, Cathy, to go to work, e3,” (c, d, e2) as “Cathy
depends on Dana to save money, e2,” and (c, a, e2) as “Cathy, depends on Arthur to save money, e2”.
Figure 1.2, visualizes a role network. A norm “carpooling lane can only be used if you share, i.e., if you
are two or more people in the car” creates a dependency. In our example, the graph contains only the actual
norm e4 between roles r2 and r1. Normative dependence (r2, r1, e4) may be read as “driver 1 depends on
passenger 1 to be able to use the carpooling lane.” We now consider the agent role assignment visualized
in Figure 1.3. Role assignment (a, r1), may be read as “agent a, Arthur, plays the role r1, passenger 1,”
(b : r2) as “agent b, Betty, plays the role r2, driver 1,” (c, r3), may be read as “agent c, Cathy, plays the
role r3, driver 2,” (d : r4) as “agent d, Dana, plays the role r4, passenger 2.” Figure 1.4 visualizes the
combined models. Each one of the three possible situations is depicted within an oval. Each double-circle
node depicts an agent/role, for example (a : r1) can be read as “agent a, Arthur, plays the role of passenger
1.” We have multiple instances of drivers and passengers because each role can be played by one agent only
(see Sauro [11] for a further explanation and discussion, they are sometimes called role instances).
3.2 Proposals and agreements
We associate sets of proposals for agreements with dependence networks. A proposal for an agreement
is a dependence relation, and a proposal function is a function from abstract dependence networks to sets
of proposals. Dependence (d, p, e) proposes a commitment of the performer p to act in the benefit of the
depender d to fulfill a goal, perform a task, or provide a resource.
Example 3 (continued) The three proposals for agreements are visualized in Figure 1.4. by the three ovals,
and each oval is a dependence networks itself. For each role playing dependence network, the proposal
function gives all these proposals.
For modeling the interaction among the agents, we use a standard definition from game theory [14]. A
proposal P1 dominates a proposal P2 if and only if for all agents involved in P1, the pay-off in P1 is at least
as good as in P2, and for at least one of them it is strictly better. The restriction to agents of P1 is crucial:
there may be agents who are worse off in P2, but they cannot argue against it. For the costs and benefits of
the agents, we add the costs and benefits for all the roles they play. It may be that an agent has a negative
pay-off for one of its roles, as long as the sum of all payoffs for all the roles he is playing is positive.
Definition 3 (Undominated proposal) Let DN = 〈play,E,D, c, b〉 be a role playing dependence net-
work. A proposal P ⊆ D for DN is a dependence relation. A proposal function p is a function from role
playing dependence networks to sets of proposals p(〈play,R,D, c, b〉) ⊆ 2D. The reasons where agent a
has a benefit in proposalP , written as benefits(a, P ), are {e ∈ E | p ∈ A, r1, r2 ∈ R, ((a, r1), (p, r2), e) ∈ P}.
Analogously, the reasons where he has a cost in proposal P , written as costs(a, P ), are {e ∈ E | d ∈
A, r1, r2 ∈ R, ((d, r1), (a, r2), e) ∈ P}. The payoff of a proposal P for agent a, written as pay-off(a, P ),
is Σe∈benefits(a, P )b(a, e) − Σr∈costs(a, P )c(a, e). We write A(P ) = {a ∈ A : ∃((a, r1), (p, r2), e) ∈
P or ∃((d, r1), (a, r2), e) ∈ P} for the agents of a proposal P . A proposal P1 dominates proposal P2,
written as P1 > P2, if and only if the following two conditions hold: ∀a ∈ A(P1) : payoff(a, P1) ≥
payoff(a, P2) and ∃a ∈ A(P1) : payoff(a, P1) > payoff(a, P2).
3.3 Acceptable proposals
To define acceptable proposals, we introduce the basic concepts of Dung’s abstract argumentation [8]. Dom-
inance is not strong enough to reject a proposal, as several proposals can be accepted at the same time. We
introduce now an attack relation among proposals such that a proposal attacks another proposal when ac-
cepting the former implies that the latter is not acceptable. Moreover, we say that a proposal attacks itself if
the payoff for at least one of the agents is negative. Dung’s theory offers the choice among several alterna-
tives to define when an individual argument is acceptable. First we have to choose a semantics, then we have
to choose whether the argument must be in the union or intersection of the extensions of this semantics. We
say that an argument is acceptable if it is in the union of all admissible sets (which is the same as being in
the union of the complete extensions, or the union of the preferred extensions).
Definition 4 (Acceptable proposal) A proposal argumentation framework (AF) is a pair 〈P, ↪→〉 where P
is a set of proposals called arguments and ↪→⊆ P × P is a binary attack relation over proposals, where
P1 ↪→ P2 if and only if P1 dominates P1 ∪ P2, or P1 = P2 and the payoff of at least one of the agents is
negative. Let C ⊆ P . A set C is conflict-free if and only if there exist no Pi, Pj ∈ C such that Pi ↪→ Pj .
A set C defends an argument Pi if and only if for each argument Pj ∈ P if Pj attacks Pi then there exists
Pk ∈ C such that Pk attacks Pj . Let C be a conflict-free set of arguments, and let D : 2P 7→ 2P be the
function such that D(C) = {P |C defends P}. C is admissible if and only if C ⊆ D(C). A proposal is
acceptable, if and only if it is in some admissible set.
The example illustrates the central concepts of argumentation, reinstatement and dialogue games.
Example 4 (continued) The three proposals / ovals in Figure 1.4 may be called ArthurBetty, ArthurCathy,
and DanaCathy. We have that ArthurBetty attacks ArthurCathy, and that ArthurCathy and DanaCathy at-
tack each other. For example, ArthurBetty and ArthurCathy are conflicting, because Arthur needs only a
single ride. ArthurBetty attacks ArthurCathy but not vice versa because ArthurBetty dominates Arthur-
Cathy: Arthur prefers to ride with Betty. Moreover, he is the only agent involved in both proposals, so he
has the power to choose which one he will investigate first.
Both ArthurBetty and DanaCathy are acceptable proposals. As Arthur will propose an agreement with
Betty, Dana and Cathy can form another agreement. Using argument games, it is modelled as:
• Dana: Hi Cathy, I need to go to work. Can I get a ride with you?
(Proposal for agreement DanaCathy.)
• Cathy: Hi, I am sorry Dana, but I planned to give Arthur a ride today ...
(Proposal for alternative agreement ArthurCathy.)
• Arthur: Hmm...Actually, I really prefer riding with Betty.
(Proposal for alternative agreement ArthurBetty.)
• ArthurBetty is optimal so it is accepted
• ArthurCathy is therefore rejected
• DanaCathy no longer has an alternative, and is therefore accepted due to the reinstatement principle.
The following proposition provides argumentation foundations for the do-ut-des principle. A proposal
is exchange-based (or transaction-based) if every dependence is part of a cycle. This represents the fact
that cooperation is based on reciprocity, called also do-ut-des [11]. If a reason occurs more than once in an
abstract DN , it represents an OR-dependence. If it occurs more than once in a proposal, it is redundant.
Definition 5 (Non-redundant proposals) A cycle is a sequence of dependencies
(s1, t1, d1), . . . , (sn, tn, dn) such that ti = si+1 for 1 ≤ i ≤ n − 1, and tn = s1. A proposal P ⊆ D
is exchange-based if and only if there is a set of cycles C such that P = ∪C. Proposal P ⊆ D is non-
redundant if and only if each reason occurs at most once.
Proposition 1 (Do-ut-des) If a proposal is acceptable, then it is exchange-based and non-redundant. If
a proposal is exchange-based and non-redundant, then there are cost and benefit functions such that the
proposal is acceptable.
Example 5 (continued) Proposals in Figure 1.4 are do-ut-des. A proposal that is not do-ut-des is the
dependence relation {(a : r1, c : r3, e1)}: Arthur shares Cathy’s car, but does not give anything in return.
3.4 Minimal proposals
In this section, we define a suitable notion of minimal proposal. For example, if proposals consist of sub-
proposals of disconnected components, then the agents can negotiate the sub-proposals one at a time.
Definition 6 (Minimal proposal) A proposal P is minimal iff it cannot be partitioned into two or more
disjoint proposals P = P1 ∪ . . . ∪ Pn, such that P is acceptable iff for 1 ≤ i ≤ n: Pi is acceptable.
The following proposition provides argumentation foundations for Sauro [11]’s indecomposable do-ut-
des property, abbreviated to i-dud. It shows that if a proposal is minimal, then it cannot be split into two
sub-proposals sharing at most one agent.
Proposition 2 (Indecomposable do-ut-des) If proposal P is minimal, then there are no disjoint nonempty
proposals P1 and P2 such that P = P1 ∪ P2 and P1 and P2 share at most one agent. If P is a proposal
such that there are no disjoint nonempty proposals P1 and P2 such that P = P1 ∪ P2 and P1 and P2 share
at most one agent, then there are cost and benefit functions such that P is minimal.
Example 6 (continued) Proposals in Figure 1.4 are i-dud. A proposal that is do-ut-des but not i-dud is the
dependence relation {(a : r1, b : r2, e1), (b : r2, a : r1, e4), (c : r3, d : r4, e2), (d : r4, c : r3, e3)}.
4 Agreements on norms and roles
Norms and roles are mechanisms to obtain desired social behaviour, that is, to obtain desired agreements. We
can use agreement technologies to obtain agreements on which norms are in force in the system, or which
roles the agents play. In theory we could even consider higher level agreements, such as which meta-norms
are in force to agree on which norms are in force. In the full model, we can use the agreement technologies
to agree on the semantics for interoperability, or the trustworthiness of agents. In Figure 1, such agreements
explain the role dependencies in Figure 1.2., and the role assignments in Figure 1.3.
Due to space limitations, we can only sketch the theory of higher levels agreements. Creating norms
means that the set of acceptable agreements changes. The number of possible agreements can decrease,
for example because sanctions make some agreements unacceptable, or increase, for example when an
obligation becomes an incentive to start cooperating. Likewise, the assignment of roles to agents may
increase or decrease the number of acceptable agreements.
4.1 Norm agreements
A social objective can be either a dependence relation that must be realized, called a positive objective and
written as O+, or a dependence relation that should not be realized, called a negative objective and written
as O−. For example, the agents are desired to help each other, not to crash into each other, etc.
Definition 7 (System objective) LetDN = 〈N,E,D, c, b〉 be a dependence network. The system objective
O = 〈O+, O−〉 with O+, O− ⊆ N ×N × E is a pair of dependence relations.
Norms are mechanisms used to obtain the social objective. We distinguish two kinds of norms. First,
sanctions can be put on existing dependencies, such as penalties or taxes, and thus change only the cost and
benefit functions. Second, obligations create new dependence relations, as the obligation of Betty in the
running example. As with dependence networks and proposals for agreements, to model the norm creation
problem, we start with a graph of all possible norms, and the actual role dependence is a sub graph.
Definition 8 (Norm design) A norm networkNN is a tuple 〈R,E,D+, c−, c+, b−, b+〉 whereR andE are
two disjoint sets (of roles and reasons, respectively), and D+ ⊆ A × A × R is a binary relation over roles
for each reason such that (d1, p1, r) and (d2, p2, r) implies d1 = d2, and c−, c+, b−, b+ : A × R → IR0
are upper and lower bounds for the cost and benefit functions from roles and reasons to nonnegative real
numbers. A role dependence network 〈R,E,D, c, b〉 is a norm for NN if and only if D ⊆ D+, c− ≤ c ≤ c+
and d− ≤ d ≤ d+.
There are various ways to evaluate role networks against the system objective, or to compare role depen-
dence networks with each other.
Definition 9 A role dependence network is acceptable if there is an acceptable proposal of the role playing
agent dependence network containing O+ and not containing an element of O−.
4.2 Role assignment agreements
To model the role assignment problem, we can give as input a role network — set of possible role assign-
ments — as a bipartite graph from agents or roles. The role network represents capabilities: who has the
capabilities (diplomas, rank, etc.) to play a certain role.
Definition 10 (Role network) A role network is a tuple RN = 〈A,R, PLAY 〉 where A and R are two
disjoint sets (of agents and roles, respectively), and PLAY ⊆ A × R is a binary relation. A relation
play ⊆ A×R is a role assignment for RN iff play ⊆ PLAY and each agent plays at most one role.
The role assignment problem is analogous to the norm creation problem. Moreover, dialogues on norm
creation and role assignment are analogous to dialogue in Example 4. How the three agreement processes
interact is left for further research.
5 Summary and outlook
We introduce a uniform theory for arguing about agreements among role playing agents. Dependencies
among role playing agents either derive from the dependencies among the agents, or from the dependencies
among the roles the agents play. The reasons for dependences among agents are goals, tasks and resources,
and the reasons for dependences among roles are ought-to-be and ought-to-do obligations. We identify
three kinds of agreements in our case study: agreements about car sharing, agreements about the norms in
force, and agreements about role assignment. Due to space limitations, we only detailed the theory about
the first kinds of agreements, and leave the details of the other agreements for future research. The theory
about agreement establishes two kinds of results, one regarding admissibility, and another one regarding
minimality. They make argumentation more efficient by focussing on the relevant alternatives. On the one
side, admissibility: acceptable proposals are based on the do-ut-des principle: every agent gains something
from the agreement. Likewise, acceptable role assignments and acceptable norms must have an effect on
behavior, in the sense that acceptable role assignments and norms must create new cycles. On the other
side, minimality: minimal proposals are based on the indecomposable do-ut-des principle: the proposal
cannot be split into sub proposals. Likewise, minimal role assignments and norms should reach their goal
effectively. Besides formalising the norm creation and role assignment agreements, in future research we
will also extend our model to the other two layers of the agreement technologies tower.
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